Recommendations in the United States suggest limiting the number of patient records displayed in an electronic health record (EHR) to 1 at a time, although little evidence supports this recommendation.
I n 2016, more than 600 000 patients in US hospitals were estimated to have had an order placed for them that was intended for another patient. [1] [2] [3] Such errors have resulted in serious harm including patient deaths. 4 In one study conducted in a large health system, the most frequent type of erroneous outpatient medication orders (1133 errors made by 542 prescribers) was placing orders for the wrong patient. 5 This problem has persisted despite implementation of patient identification interventions within electronic health record (EHR) systems, such as verification alerts 3, 6 and patient photographs, 7 and despite a Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goal requiring methods for accurate patient identification in effect since 2003. 8 To promote the safe use of health information technology, the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) 9 and The Joint Commission 10 issued recommendations that health systems limit the number of records displayed in the EHR to 1 at a time. However, these recommendations cite expert opinion, 9, 11, 12 which reasoned that allowing multiple records open concurrently increases the risk of wrong-patient errors. 7, 13 Despite these recommendations, there is wide variation in practice. In a US survey of chief information officers, 112 respondents reporting on 167 inpatient and outpatient facilities stated that among EHRs with the capability to open multiple records, 44% allowed 3 or more records open, 38% restricted to 1 record open, and 17% allowed 2 records open. 14 Respondents reported weighing concerns about wrongpatient errors against the need for efficiency and seeking to strike a balance between safety and efficiency. Given the lack of evidence, as well as lack of consensus, this randomized trial was conducted to test the hypothesis that a restricted configuration, limiting clinicians to 1 patient record open at a time, would result in significantly fewer wrong-patient orders than an unrestricted configuration allowing up to 4 records open.
Methods

Trial Design and Intervention
This randomized clinical trial was conducted from October 2015 to April 2017 at a large academic medical center in New York to assess the risk of wrong-patient electronic order errors in an EHR system configured to display only 1 vs a maximum of 4 patient records at once. Trial sites included 4 hospitals with a total of 1536 beds, 5 emergency departments (EDs), and 144 outpatient facilities. The protocol and statistical analysis plan are available in Supplement 1. The study protocol was approved by the institutional review boards of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine and Columbia University Irving Medical Center. Waiver of informed consent was granted for clinicians and patients.
All clinicians with the authority to place electronic orders were randomly assigned in a 1:1 ratio to either a configuration that restricted to 1 patient record open at a time (restricted group) or a configuration that allowed up to 4 patient records open concurrently (unrestricted group). Clinicians were excluded if their workflow either (1) had a defined requirement to open 2 patient records simultaneously (eg, mother-infant services) or (2) bypassed the standard order entry process and therefore would not be captured by the outcome measure (eg, radiologists).
The trial coincided with the implementation of a new EHR system (EpicCare, Epic Systems Corporation) at all study sites, and every eligible clinician was randomized at the time of credentialing in the new system. The previous EHR did not have the capability of opening more than 1 record at a time. An information technology specialist responsible for assigning user templates performed the randomization. A computerized random number generator was used to create a group assignment for each user at the time of randomization, thus ensuring concealed allocation and the inability to predict future assignments to the restricted or unrestricted groups. Then, using an existing feature of the EHR, each clinician was manually assigned to 1 of 2 EHR user-role templates that differed only in the number of patient records allowed open concurrently.
Clinicians could place orders only by opening the patient's record and there was no requirement to confirm orders or the patient's identity before the orders were transmitted. In the restricted configuration, clinicians could open and view only 1 patient record at a time. In the unrestricted configuration, clinicians could open and view up to 4 records at once, with patients' names displayed in separate tabs for each patient along the top of the screen. In both the restricted and unrestricted configurations, the active patient's name, age, sex, date of birth, location, and attending physician were displayed in the banner at the top of the screen. Switching between patients required a single click in the unrestricted configuration, if both records were open. In the restricted configuration, switching to a different patient record required closing the first patient's record, then looking up and selecting the second patient. Going back to the first patient's record required the same process. orders in the wrong patient's record, several individual orders may have been entered and subsequently retracted together. Thus, the order session, rather than each order, represented an independent opportunity for a wrong-patient error to occur.
Wrong-patient orders were defined as orders placed for one patient that were intended for another patient, and were identified using the Wrong-Patient Retract-and-Reorder (RAR) measure, a validated measure endorsed by the National Quality Forum. 15 The measure uses an electronic query to identify wrong-patient RAR events, defined as 1 or more orders placed for a patient that are retracted (cancelled) by the same clinician within 10 minutes, and then reordered by the same clinician for a different patient within the next 10 minutes. In a validation study, real-time telephone interviews with clinicians demonstrated that 76.2% of RAR events identified by the measure were confirmed to be wrong-patient orders 3 (eMethods and eFigure 1 in Supplement 2). The WrongPatient RAR measure has been used in studies to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions aimed at decreasing wrongpatient orders, and has been validated and used in varied clinical settings and EHR systems. 3, 6, [16] [17] [18] [19] In this trial, the primary outcome was wrong-patient order sessions, defined as order sessions that included at least 1 wrong-patient RAR event.
To examine clinician utilization of the multiple-records capability in the unrestricted group, an electronic log was created that recorded the number of records open at the time each order was placed. This enabled examination of the proportion of orders and order sessions completed when 1, 2, 3, or 4 records were open.
Data were extracted for all orders (eg, prescriptions, medications, laboratory tests, imaging studies, and other types) placed by randomized clinicians during the trial period. Orders for referrals and consultations were excluded. Data for each order, including order, patient, and clinician characteristics, were extracted retrospectively from the health system data warehouse at the end of the trial period. Using this approach, there were no missing outcome data.
Statistical Analysis
Based on prior experience in this setting, we assumed 100 wrong-patient order sessions per 100 000 order sessions in the unrestricted group and an intraclinician correlation of 0.01. With approximately 1600 clinicians in each randomization group and a trial duration yielding an average of approximately 1300 order sessions per clinician with a coefficient of variation of 1.2, the trial had more than 99% power to detect an odds ratio (OR) of 0.5 (or lower), 96% power to detect an OR of 0.6, and 76% power to detect an OR of 0.7.
The primary analysis included all order sessions performed by clinicians according to their assigned randomization group (as-randomized analysis). The primary outcome variable was dichotomous, indicating whether each order session contained a wrong-patient RAR event, and was reported as the number of wrong-patient order sessions per 100 000 order sessions. To determine the effect of trial group on wrongpatient order sessions, random-effects logistic regression models were used with RAR order sessions as the outcome and randomization group as the independent variable, using clinician as a random intercept to account for nesting of order sessions within clinicians. The effect was estimated using the OR and its 95% CI, and the Wald test of significance was used with a 2-sided α = .05.
Prespecified secondary analyses included subgroup analyses to (1) examine the effect of intervention group stratified by clinical setting and (2) assess clinician utilization of multiple records in the unrestricted group. For subgroup analyses, clinical settings were prespecified and included the ED, inpatient, and outpatient locations, and for inpatient units, included medical/surgical, critical care, pediatrics, and obstetrics units. As in the primary analysis, mixed-effects models were used for each predefined subgroup, with a separate model including interaction terms. The significance of interaction effects was tested by a joint Wald test of the interaction terms' coefficients.
For the analysis of clinician utilization of the multiplerecords capability in the unrestricted group, the percentage of all order sessions were reported when 1, 2, 3, or 4 records were open at the time of ordering, overall and stratified by clinical setting. Because a clinician could open or close patient records while placing a series of orders during a single order session, order sessions that contained orders placed with different numbers of records open were reported as "varying."
In addition, a post hoc analysis was performed to examine the rate of wrong-patient order sessions by number of records open when orders were placed in the unrestricted group, overall and stratified by clinical setting. The significance of differences was tested using a χ 2 test. Because of an administrative error, some clinicians were not assigned to the trial group to which they were randomized. Therefore, all analyses were repeated according to intervention received (as-treated analyses), such that each order or order session was characterized by the clinician's configuration (restricted or unrestricted) at the time the orders were placed. In addition, using orders rather than order sessions as the unit of analysis, the number of orders and rate of errors were examined by study group and in each prespecified subgroup (Supplement 2). All analyses were conducted using Stata version 15.1 (StataCorp).
Results
Study Population
A total of 3356 clinicians were randomized and included in the primary analysis, 1669 in the restricted group and 1687 in the unrestricted group (Figure 1) . The analysis included a total of 12 140 298 orders, in 4 486 631 order sessions, placed for 543 490 patients. Characteristics of clinicians, order sessions, and patients are shown in Table 1 . Clinician characteristics were similar between groups including age (mean, 42.9 vs 43.2 years), sex (female, 56.0% vs 56.8%), years of experience at the study site (mean, 6.4 vs 6.6), clinician type, and primary practice setting. Order characteristics (medications, laboratory tests, imaging studies, and other types) are reported in eTable 1 in Supplement 2.
Primary Analysis
Overall, the proportion of wrong-patient order sessions in the restricted vs unrestricted group was 90.7 vs 88.0 per 100 000 order sessions, respectively (OR, 1.03 [95% CI, 0.90-1.20]; P = .60; absolute difference, 2.7 per 100 000 [95% CI, -2.8 to 8.2]) ( Figure 2) . Similarly, in subgroup analyses, there were no statistically significant differences in wrong-patient order sessions in the restricted vs unrestricted group in any clinical setting examined: ED, 157. 8 . Within the inpatient setting, critical care and obstetrical units had the highest rates of errors. The intervention effect did not differ among these groups (P for interaction = .99). Results at the order level are presented in eTable 2 in Supplement 2.
As-Treated Analysis
Because of administrative error, a total of 400 clinicians were not assigned to the trial group to which they were randomized. Of these, 305 were assigned to the opposite group at the beginning of the trial and remained in that group throughout (185 randomized to the restricted group and 120 randomized to the unrestricted group); 95 switched groups during the trial (84 from the restricted to unrestricted group and 11 from the unrestricted to restricted group). Study groups in the astreated analysis did not differ with respect to age, sex, experience, or clinician type. Consistent with the primary analysis, there were no statistically significant differences in wrongpatient order sessions in the restricted vs unrestricted group in the as-treated analysis, overall (OR, 1.03 [95% CI, 0.89-1.19]; P = .68) or in any clinical setting. Clinician characteristics and results for the as-treated analyses at the order session The primary analysis included all orders placed by clinicians according to their assigned randomization group (as-randomized analysis). Of 3356 clinicians randomized, 400 were not assigned to the trial group to which they were randomized. Of these, 305 were assigned to the opposite group at the beginning of the trial and remained in that group throughout (185 from restricted to unrestricted, 120 from unrestricted to restricted); 95 switched groups during the trial (84 from restricted to unrestricted, 11 from unrestricted to restricted). All assessments were repeated per treatment received (as-treated analysis).
a "Other" included nonclinical staff who were not authorized to place orders. Table 2) .
Post Hoc Analysis
In a post hoc analysis of order sessions in the unrestricted group, the number of wrong-patient order sessions com c Random-effects logistic regression models were constructed, using the order session as the unit of analysis and the clinician as the random intercept. The order session, a series of orders placed consecutively by a single clinician for a single patient, represents an independent opportunity for an error to occur. Wrong-patient order sessions were defined as order sessions that included at least 1 wrong-patient Retract-and-Reorder event. The intervention effect did not differ among subgroups defined by practice setting; P for interaction = .99.
setting examined in both as-randomized and as-treated analyses. However, given the ability to open up to 4 records, clinicians randomized to the unrestricted configuration completed 66% of order sessions with a single record open, limiting the study power to detect a treatment effect. Nonetheless, this study provides evidence that may help to inform national recommendations and local EHR configuration decisions, and raises uncertainty whether restricting the number of records allowed open concurrently reduces wrong-patient errors.
In a post hoc analysis of order sessions in the unrestricted group, there was a graded increase in the rate of errors as more records were open at the time the orders were placed. However, the association between multiple records open and increased risk of error was largely attenuated when the analysis was stratified by clinical setting because most order sessions in the outpatient setting were completed with only 1 record open and were at very low risk for error. It is possible that having multiple records open leads to an increase in the risk of error. Alternatively, having multiple records open may be a marker of a high-risk situation rather than the cause of increased risk. A recent direct observation study demonstrated that multitasking and interruptions were associated with increased rates of prescribing errors, which may be unmeasured confounders in the post hoc analysis reported here. 20 In the present study, clinicians in the ED randomized to the unrestricted group completed 66% of order sessions with 2 or more records open, and of all clinical settings placed the highest proportion of orders with the maximum of 4 records open. EDs are considered high-risk settings as clinicians care for multiple acutely ill patients concurrently, [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] many of whom require complex treatment, in a fast-paced environment characterized by frequent interruptions. [25] [26] [27] [28] Because of the demands of the environment and that clinicians in the ED commonly had multiple records open when placing orders, restricting to 1 record might be expected to have the most benefit of any clinical setting. However, results in this setting showed no significant difference in wrong-patient order errors between trial groups, with an OR of 1.00. To our knowledge, the only prior study evaluating the safety of multiple records in an EHR was an interrupted time series analysis conducted in the ED of a large academic medical center, using the RAR measure as the outcome. 19 Results demonstrated no significant decrease in wrong-patient medication orders by limiting the maximum number of records that could be open concurrently from 4 to 2 (85.9 vs 82.9 errors per 100 000 orders) and no increase after transitioning back to a maximum of 4 records (82.2 errors per 100 000 orders) at 2-year intervals. 19 Although that study was limited to the ED and used a nonrandomized design, the findings are consistent with the results of this randomized trial conducted in a different health system and using a different EHR. Although no differences in wrong-patient orders were observed between the restricted group and the unrestricted group in this trial, there was considerable variation in the frequency of errors in different clinical settings. The rate of wrongpatient order errors was lowest in outpatient settings, where clinicians may be more likely to care for 1 patient at a time, and highest in inpatient critical care and obstetrics units. These variations likely reflect differences in workflows and number of patients being cared for simultaneously, and highlight the need for targeted interventions to reduce wrong-patient errors in high-risk settings.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, because clinicians in the unrestricted group completed 66% of order sessions with a single record open, the trial had limited power to detect a treatment effect and consequently does not establish whether reducing the number of records open when placing orders reduces the risk of order errors. However, the trial had sufficient power to test the primary question of whether a restricted vs unrestricted configuration reduces wrong-patient orders. Second, the RAR measure identifies a single type of nearmiss, wrong-patient error detected and corrected within a 20-minute timeframe. It was not designed to capture all wrongpatient errors and its sensitivity is unknown, as are the number and distribution of wrong-patient errors that the measure may have missed. However, the RAR measure systematically quantifies near-miss, wrong-patient order errors; provides sufficient outcome events to power research studies; and is not susceptible to reporting bias as is voluntary error reporting. Furthermore, the use of near-miss errors to test safety interventions in health care is endorsed by the major organizations dedicated to patient safety. [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] Third, because participants were aware of the study, they may have altered their behavior, thus biasing results toward the null (ie, the Hawthorne effect). While participants may have been aware of the study, it is unlikely that a large number of clinicians could maintain vigilance in their usual workflows over the extended trial period as to substantially reduce errors. Fourth, approximately 10% of study participants were not assigned to their randomized group. However, all analyses were repeated in as-treated analyses (per treatment received) and yielded consistent results (presented in eTables 3 and 4 and eFigure 3 in Supplement 2). Fifth, although this multisite trial included 4 hospitals, 5 EDs, and 144 outpatient settings, it was conducted within a single health system using a single EHR platform and therefore results may not be generalizable to other medical centers and EHR systems. Role of the Funder/Sponsor: The funding agency had no role in the design and conduct of the study; collection, management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; and decision to submit the manuscript for publication. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Frequency of wrong-patient orders. At least 70,000 U.S. physicians use computerized provider order entry (CPOE) to place orders. 1, 2 Although CPOE is associated with a reduction in medical errors, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] when orders are placed electronically certain types of errors, including placing orders on the wrong patient, may occur more frequently. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] The danger of wrong-patient electronic orders was highlighted by one hospital's report that after implementing CPOE, medications were prescribed for the wrong patient several times per month.
14 In 2003, the United States Pharmacopeia analyzed 7,029 voluntarily reported medication errors over a 7-month period and found a mean of 9 wrong-patient orders at each of 120 participating institutions using CPOE. 15 This report likely under-estimated the extent of wrong-patient electronic orders, as voluntary reporting is known to be an unreliable method for identifying errors. [16] [17] Dr. Jason Adelman, the Principal Investigator of this proposal, developed an automated surveillance tool, the Wrong-Patient Retract-and Reorder measure, that identified 5,246 orders placed on the wrong patient in one year at a single academic medical center, with a rate of 58 wrong-patient orders per 100,000 orders. 18 In that year, 1 in 6 providers placed an order on the wrong-patient, and 1 in 37 hospitalized patients had an order placed for them in error. This was the first study using automated surveillance to identify wrong-patient orders, and it demonstrated the prevalence of wrong-patient orders to be significantly higher than previously thought.
Potential risk of placing an order on the wrong patient when multiple medical records are open at once. Although there have been no studies quantifying (or even establishing) an increased risk of wrong-patient errors when providers have multiple records open at once, there have been several articles and expert opinions that warn of this potential risk. In an abstract presented at the 2012 American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA) conference, researchers presented a survey of Chief Medical Information Officers (CMIOs) evaluating the causes of wrong-patient errors in CPOE systems, and reported "[CMIO respondents] attributed wrong-patient errors to the ability to view multiple charts on one computer simultaneously and poor screen design." 19 In a 2012 study, Hyman et al hypothesized that having multiple records open at once increased the rate of wrongpatient errors, but reported they were "unable to determine whether there was any link between the reported errors and multiple records having been open." 20 A 2013 study published in JAMIA evaluated 32 wrong-patient errors, and noted that 60% of these errors occurred in systems that allowed at least two charts open simultaneously. Investigators did not measure total orders, and therefore could not determine error rates and quantify the relationship between the number of records open at a time and the risk of wrong-patient errors. 21 A 2013 white paper titled, How to Identify and Address Unsafe Conditions Associated with Health Information Technology published by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) claimed that data can be entered "incorrectly into the electronic record due to multiple records being open," but no reference was provided supporting this statement. 22 
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The mechanism by which multiple patient records open simultaneously can lead to a wrongpatient error may be related to the ease with which users can toggle between patient records and the similar looking computer screens. The magnitude of this risk needs to be established to help IT leadership decide on how to safely implement CPOE systems. There have been no studies that have evaluated whether multiple records open increase the risk of wrong-patient errors, by how much, and if any increase is dependent on the number of records open (i.e., is four records open simultaneously more dangerous than three? Is three worse than two?). Our research is an important first step in quantifying this risk. Table 1 provides some comments from CMIOs explaining why they chose to establish an unrestricted environment or restricted environment, and why some hospitals decided to switch configurations after the initial instillation. The results of this survey demonstrate that IT leadership is lacking objective data to guide their decision on how many patient records allowed open at once in EHRs. 
Examples of comments from CMIOs who established a restricted environment.
• My organization chose to allow only one EHR open at a time…. We feel that multiple records open and in use by the same person is not good practice and is an error waiting to happen.
• Our software vendor allows three records to be opened at once. We made the decision to only allow one record to be opened. We also analyzed our facility in terms of noise levels and distractions and decided that having multiple charts open had the potential of a significant patient safety issue.
Examples of comments from CMIOs who established an unrestricted environment.
• The need to multitask is inherit in today's practice of medicine. We are commonly called to provide coverage for patients for a simple task. To leave a chart and then return becomes a high burden.
• I think the efficiency benefits are such that this is justified. There are other ways to prevent wrong-patient problems.
Examples of comments from CMIOs who changed configurations after the initial installation.
• We had wrong-patient errors when we let users access up to three charts at one time, which is why we now limit to just one.
• Our system for many years only allowed one patient chart to be open. Due to some complaints and arguments that it would increase efficiency, a decision was made to allow more than one
The feasibility of this study is a result of developing a validated and reliable measure of wrong-patient errors. Adelman et al developed the Wrong-Patient Retract-andReorder (RAR) measure as an automated method for identifying wrong-patient electronic orders. 18 This measure will be used to identify the primary outcome in this study. It works by identifying orders placed for a patient that are retracted within 10 minutes and then placed by the same provider for a different patient within the next 10 minutes (Figure 1) . We performed real-time confirmatory telephone interviews with providers who placed and retracted orders to validate the RAR measure. These phone interviews with ordering providers demonstrated that the RAR measure correctly identified near-miss errors in 170 of 223 cases (positive predictive value 76.2%).
Near-miss errors in patient safety research. The Wrong-Patient RAR measure identifies near-miss errors rather than errors that reach the patient and cause harm. Near-miss errors are also referred to as "close calls" by the Department of Veterans Affairs, 23 "good catches" by the National Association for Healthcare Quality, 24 and "free lessons" by the safety expert James Reason. 25 The use of near-miss errors to test safety improvements in healthcare is encouraged by every major patient safety organization including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Institute of Medicine (IOM), World Health Organization (WHO), Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), and The Joint Commission (JCAHO), [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] because they have been shown by safety experts to have the same causal pathway as errors that cause harm. chart to be opened. Less than a year later, it got reverted back because of the increase in documentation errors as reported by the HIMS department. The link in the causal pathways is demonstrated graphically in the Incident Causation Model first described by industrial safety expert T.W. Van der Schaaf (Figure 2) . 26 In this model, the key distinction between an adverse event and a near-miss error is that in the latter a "human recovery" occurs, just before the error reaches a patient and causes harm. This principle is the foundation for the RAR measure, which identifies self-caught errors. In a study by Bates 32 Since 2005, AHRQ has coordinated the development and maintenance of the "Common Formats" for national reporting of patient safety events to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), and has included near-miss errors as important patient safety data to be collected and analyzed. 33 In addition, AHRQ currently has 141 articles under the "Near-Miss Collection" on the AHRQ Patient Safety Network website, which reviews research and lessons learned specifically related to near-miss errors.
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Harm from wrong-patient orders. Until recently, most knowledge about harm from wrongpatient orders came from anecdotal reports. For example, in March 2011 the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) published a case report of a physician who used CPOE and accidentally ordered a sedative and paralytic agent for the wrong patient, resulting in respiratory arrest and death. 35 Prior to the Montefiore study, there were no publications that attempted to quantify harm or potential harm from wrong-patient orders. To examine the potential for harm associated with wrong-patient orders, we examined 5,246 near-miss errors identified using the RAR tool and classified 971 errors as clinically significant, 264 as serious, and 126 as life threatening.
18
Preliminary Studies
Determining the rate of wrong-patient orders. Adelman and colleagues developed and validated the Wrong-Patient RAR measure as an automated tool for capturing wrong-patient orders. After validating the Wrong-Patient RAR measure, we applied it to the complete data set of over 9 million electronic orders placed at a large academic medical center in one year. 18 The Wrong-Patient 6 RAR measure found that 1,388 providers placed 6,885 orders that were retracted and reordered. Multiplying the proportion of retracted orders identified by the positive predictive value of 76.2%, we estimated that 5,246 wrong-patient orders were placed, with an average of 14 retracted orders per day, 1 in 6 providers placed an order on the wrong-patient and retracted it, and 1 in 37 hospitalized patients had an order placed for them in error.
Using the Wrong-Patient RAR measure in a randomized controlled trial evaluating two interventions for preventing wrong-patient orders. We conducted a three-arm randomized controlled trial to test two interventions designed to prevent wrong-patient orders: an ID-verify alert that displayed the patient's name, gender, and age for the provider to verify with one click; and an IDreentry function that blocked access to the order entry screen until the provider entered the patient's initials, gender, and age. 18 Over 4,000 providers who placed inpatient orders were randomly assigned to receive the ID-verify alert, the ID-reentry function, or neither. Over one million orders were placed in each arm of the study. Compared with the control condition, the ID-verify alert reduced the odds of a wrong-patient order by 16% and the ID-reentry function reduced the odds of a wrong-patient order by 41%. The study found that wrong-patient orders are common, and that interventions like the ID-verify alert and the ID-reentry function can lower the frequency of wrong-patient orders. Although a 41% reduction of wrong-patient errors is substantial, additional safety measures are needed to achieve more complete protection for patients. Study Sites. The trial will be conducted at Montefiore Medical Center, an integrated regional health system and academic medical center in New York. Study sites include four hospitals, five emergency departments, and more than 100 ambulatory facilities. The health system will use the EpicCare EHR system during this study; Epic has committed to support the project in implementing the WrongPatient RAR measure as well as developing and programming a log to capture the number of records open at the time of placing each order. Montefiore met the following six criteria for inclusion as a study site: (1) the capability to implement the Wrong-Patient RAR measure and the log to record the number of records open at the time of placing each order; (2) the capability to merge the results of the WrongPatient RAR measure with a table indicating patient, provider, and order characteristics; (3) a minimum of 30,000 admissions per year; (4) a minimum of 50,000 emergency department visits per year; (5) a minimum of 500,000 outpatient visits per year; and (6) patients representing low-income groups, minority groups, the elderly, and individuals with special health care needs ( Table 2) . 
METHODS
Orders versus Order Sessions. If a provider begins placing orders in the wrong patient's record, there is the possibility that several such orders will be placed and then retracted together. Therefore, individual orders do not represent independent opportunities for errors to occur. Orders are clustered within order sessions, defined as a series of orders placed consecutively by a single provider for a single patient that begins with opening that patient's order file and terminates when an order is placed on another patient or after 60 minutes, whichever comes first. Thus the order session, rather than each order, represents an independent opportunity for a wrong-patient error to occur.
Unit of Analysis.
The unit of analysis will be the order session.
Primary Outcome. The primary outcome measure, the Wrong-Patient RAR measure, is an electronic query run retrospectively against every order placed during the study period to identify instances in which one or more orders placed for a patient were retracted (cancelled) by the same provider within 10 minutes, and then reordered by the same provider for a different patient within the next 10 minutes (RAR events). In the validation study, phone interviews with ordering providers confirmed that the RAR measure correctly identified wrong-patient orders in 170 of 223 events, yielding a positive predictive value of 76.2% (95% confidence interval, 70.6% to 81.9%). 18 The primary outcome is wrong-patient order sessions, defined as order sessions that include a wrong-patient RAR event identified by the Wrong-Patient RAR measure.
Provider Level, Patient Level, Order-Session, and Order Level Covariates. The data will have a nested, hierarchical structure with order sessions clustered within providers. The analysis will account for this hierarchical structure and we will gather from the electronic medical record attributes of the provider, patient, order session, and order.
Provider-level covariates: type of ordering provider (attending, resident, physician assistant, nurse practitioner, pharmacist, or other), and total number of orders placed during the study period (a measure of the frequency with which the provider uses the system).
Patient-level covariates: age, race, ethnicity, sex, unit, and date and time of admission.
Order-session level covariates: location of the order session (emergency department, medicalsurgical unit, intensive care unit, labor and delivery, pediatrics, other specialty units).
Order level covariates: type of order (medication, imaging, nursing order, procedure, other), date and time of order, date and time of retraction, and number of patient records open at the time the order was placed.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Patient Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. All patients are at risk for wrong-patient orders, so all orders placed for all patients will be included in the study. We will ask to waive informed consent to patient inclusion in this study, as it poses no more than minimal risk to patients. To enhance confidentiality, we will replace medical record numbers with pseudo-identifiers in the analytic data sets prior to analysis.
Provider Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. Any provider who can place an electronic order can potentially place an order on the wrong patient. Prior work showed that wrong-patient errors are made by physicians (60 errors per 100,000 orders), nurse practitioners and physician assistants (74 errors per 100,000 orders), nurses (33 errors per 100,000 orders) and pharmacists (67 errors per 100,000 orders). 18 We will therefore include in the study all providers with the authority to place electronic orders. To protect providers' identities, all provider identifiers will be replaced with pseudoidentifiers in the analytic data sets prior to analysis. We will request a waiver of consent from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) as this study poses no more than minimal risk for providers (see Protection of Human Subjects).
Randomization
All inpatient, emergency department, and outpatient providers will be randomized in a 1:1 ratio to either a maximum of one patient record open at a time (restricted mode), or a maximum of four records open at once (unrestricted mode). Assignments will be made prior to the start of the study, and will remain constant throughout the study. A computer programmer working in the information technology (IT) department, who is not an investigator on this study, will use a computerized random number generator and assign one random number to each provider. Providers assigned odd numbers will be assigned to the restricted arm, and those assigned even numbers will be assigned to the unrestricted arm. Providers will be manually assigned per randomization to EHR user-role templates that differ only in the number of patient records allowed open. Providers newly hired after the start of the study will be assigned a random number when assigned a new user logon for the EHR from a computer programmer not affiliated with the study, and will be added to the appropriate arm based on their assigned random number. The study methodology has been approved by the Senior Vice President and Chief Medical Officer at Montefiore, as well as the Executive Lead for the Epic EHR.
Data Capture
The data required to define orders, orders sessions, and the number of open patient records, patient and provider characteristics, and RAR events is automatically captured by the Epic EHR system. Investigators will collaborate with information technology personnel at the study sites and with Epic throughout the implementation phase of the study to develop the methodology for extracting the required data. At the end of the data collection period, data for all orders placed by study providers during the study period will be extracted, de-identified, encrypted, and transmitted electronically to the investigators for analysis. These data sets will provide all of the information needed to carry out the analyses.
To examine the rate of wrong-patient orders and proportion of orders placed when one, two, three, or four records were open, an electronic log will be developed and programmed into the Epic system to record the number of records open at the time each order was placed.
Protection of Human Subjects
Confidentiality and Consent. Study data will be extracted retrospectively at the midpoint and at the end of the study period. All data sets, reports, and other study records will be de-identified for analysis. Patient medical record numbers and provider ID numbers will be replaced with pseudoidentifiers, and other personal identifiable information (PII) will be deleted from the data sets. The randomized trial will examine two EHR configurations that are both in wide use, with neither representing an established best practice. The randomized trial also does not involve any procedures for which written consent is normally required, and also does not present more than minimal risk to either patients or providers. All near-miss errors will be evaluated in the aggregate and no PII will be used in presentations, publications, or reports. Information will not be released except as necessary for monitoring by the IRB. Data Security and Integrity. All files will be kept on password-protected HIPAA-compliant computers in locked offices. Only will research personnel, namely the computer programmer, biostatistician, and prinicipal investigator, will have access to the study data. Analytic data sets will be de-identified, with patient and provider identifiers replaced with pseudo-identifiers. Data files will be imported into the native format of the statistical program to be used for analysis. The data will be checked for internal consistency. Identified anomalies will be examined, and corrections to the data will be made and documented as necessary.
Communication with providers.
At the start of the randomized trial, investigators will explain the purpose of the study to clinical staff via email and directly from within the IT system, using a message crafted by the study team. The message will assure providers that data will be kept confidential and cooperation will carry no risk to them.
Unintended consequences. All unintended consequences and confidentially breaches detected will be brought to the attention of the Chief Medical Information Officer, the Chief Medical Officer, and overseeing IRB.
Study Limitations
First, the Wrong-Patient RAR measure is designed to identify near-miss errors and does not capture wrong-patient errors that reach patients. However, near-miss errors follow the same causal pathways as errors that reach the patient and cause harm, occur more frequently, and can be reliably measured without the biases inherent in voluntary self-reports by providers. National and international patient safety and regulatory agencies endorse the use of near-miss errors to evaluate safety interventions. [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] Second, orders that are retracted and reordered beyond the 10-minute timeframe (10 minutes to retraction, 10 minutes to reorder) will not be identified by the RAR measure. However, prior work demonstrated that the average retract-and-reorder time was less than 2 minutes; the 10-minute timeframe will detect the majority of retracted near-miss order errors and identify a sufficient number of outcome events to power this study. Finally, this research is limited to only one EHR vendor system. However, when fully rolled out, Epic's clients will provide care for 45%-55% of the U.S. population. 
FINAL PROTOCOL
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
14 In 2003, the United States Pharmacopeia analyzed 7,029 voluntarily reported medication errors over a 7-month period and found a mean of 9 wrong-patient orders at each of 120 participating institutions using CPOE. 15 This report likely under-estimated the extent of wrong-patient electronic orders, as voluntary reporting is known to be an unreliable method for identifying errors. [16] [17] Dr. Jason Adelman, the Principal Investigator of this proposal, developed an automated surveillance tool, the Wrong-Patient Retract-and Reorder measure, that identified 5,246 orders placed on the wrong patient in one year at a single academic medical center, with a rate of 58 wrong-patient orders per 100,000 orders. 18 In that year, 1 in 6 providers placed an order on the wrong-patient, and 1 in 37 hospitalized patients had an order placed for them in error. This was the first study using automated surveillance to identify wrong-patient orders, and it demonstrated the prevalence of wrong-patient orders to be significantly higher than previously thought. A 2013 study published in JAMIA evaluated 32 wrong-patient errors, and noted that 60% of these errors occurred in systems that allowed at least two charts open simultaneously. Investigators did not measure total orders, and therefore could not determine error rates and quantify the relationship between the number of records open at a time and the risk of wrong-patient errors. 21 A 2013 white paper titled, How to Identify and Address Unsafe Conditions Associated with Health Information Technology published by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) claimed that data can be entered "incorrectly into the electronic record due to multiple records being open," but no reference was provided supporting this statement. 22 
Potential risk of placing
14
The mechanism by which multiple patient records open simultaneously can lead to a wrongpatient error may be related to the ease with which users can toggle between patient records and the similar looking computer screens. The magnitude of this risk needs to be established to help IT leadership decide on how to safely implement CPOE systems. There have been no studies that have evaluated whether multiple records open increase the risk of wrong-patient errors, by how much, and if any increase is dependent on the number of records open (i.e., is four records open simultaneously more dangerous than three? Is three worse than two?). Our research is an important first step in quantifying this risk. Table 1 provides some comments from CMIOs explaining why they chose to establish an unrestricted environment or restricted environment, and why some hospitals decided to switch configurations after the initial instillation. The results of this survey demonstrate that IT leadership is lacking objective data to guide their decision on how many patient records allowed open at once in EHRs. Table 1 . CMIO considerations in configuring an restricted vs unrestricted EHR environment.
Practice
Examples of comments from CMIOs who established a restricted environment.
Examples of comments from CMIOs who established an unrestricted environment.
• I think the efficiency benefits are such that this is justified. There are other ways to prevent wrongpatient problems.
Examples of comments from CMIOs who changed configurations after the initial installation.
• Our system for many years only allowed one patient chart to be open. Due to some complaints and arguments that it would increase efficiency, a decision was made to allow more than one chart to be opened. Less than a year later, it got reverted back because of the increase in documentation errors as reported by the HIMS department.
The feasibility of this study is a result of developing a validated and reliable measure of wrong-patient errors. Adelman et al developed the Wrong-Patient Retract-and-Reorder (RAR) measure as an automated method for identifying wrong-patient electronic orders. 18 This measure will be used to identify the primary outcome in this study. It works by identifying orders placed for a patient that are retracted within 10 minutes and then placed by the same provider for a different patient within the next 10 minutes (Figure 1) . We performed real-time confirmatory telephone interviews with providers who placed and retracted orders to validate the RAR measure. These phone interviews with ordering providers demonstrated that the RAR measure correctly identified near-miss errors in 170 of 223 cases (positive predictive value 76.2%).
Near-miss errors in patient safety research. The Wrong-Patient RAR measure identifies near-miss errors rather than errors that reach the patient and cause harm. Near-miss errors are also referred to as "close calls" by the Department of Veterans Affairs, 24 "good catches" by the National Association for Healthcare Quality, 25 and "free lessons" by the safety expert James Reason. 26 The use of near-miss errors to test safety improvements in healthcare is encouraged by every major patient safety organization including the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Institute of Medicine (IOM), World Health Organization (WHO), Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), and The Joint Commission (JCAHO) because they have been shown by safety experts to have the same causal pathway as errors that cause harm. [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] The link in the causal pathways is demonstrated graphically in the Incident Causation Model first described by industrial safety expert T.W. Van der Schaaf (Figure 2) . 27 In this model, the key distinction between an adverse event and a near-miss error is that in the latter a "human recovery" occurs, just before the error reaches a patient and causes harm. This principle is the foundation for the RAR measure, which identifies self-caught errors. In a study by Bates et al of 4,031 randomly selected patient records, 247 adverse drug events and 194 near-miss drug events had similar underlying causes. 32 Because nearmiss and actual errors have similar proximate causes, interventions that reduce near-miss errors should also reduce actual errors. In fact, in the seminal article that first demonstrated that CPOE systems prevent medication errors, Bates et al demonstrated that CPOE systems decreased both serious errors and near-miss errors. AHRQ's position on the use of near-miss errors. AHRQ has supported the use of nearmiss errors in patient safety initiatives. The AHRQ National Resource Center for Health Information Technology developed the Health Information Technology Evaluation Toolkit, and lists near-miss errors as a particularly useful outcome measure for the evaluation of the effectiveness and safety of Health Information Technology (HIT) projects. 33 Since 2005, AHRQ has coordinated the development and maintenance of the "Common Formats" for national reporting of patient safety events to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), and has included near-miss errors as important patient safety data to be collected and analyzed. 34 In addition, AHRQ currently has 141 articles under the "Near-Miss Collection" on the AHRQ Patient Safety Network website, which reviews research and lessons learned specifically related to near-miss errors.
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Harm from wrong-patient orders. Until recently, most knowledge about harm from wrongpatient orders came from anecdotal reports. For example, in March 2011 the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) published a case report of a physician who used CPOE and accidentally ordered a sedative and paralytic agent for the wrong patient, resulting in respiratory arrest and death. 36 Prior to the Montefiore study, there were no publications that attempted to quantify harm or potential harm from wrong-patient orders. To examine the potential for harm associated with wrong-patient orders, we examined 5,246 near-miss errors identified using the RAR tool and classified 971 errors as clinically significant, 264 as serious, and 126 as life threatening.
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Preliminary Studies
Determining the rate of wrong-patient orders. Adelman and colleagues developed and validated the Wrong-Patient RAR measure as an automated tool for capturing wrong-patient orders. After validating the Wrong-Patient RAR measure, we applied it to the complete data set of over 9 million electronic orders placed at a large academic medical center in one year. 18 The Wrong-Patient RAR measure found that 1,388 providers placed 6,885 orders that were retracted and reordered. Multiplying the proportion of retracted orders identified by the positive predictive value of 76.2%, we estimated that 5,246 wrong-patient orders were placed, with an average of 14 retracted orders per day, 1 in 6 providers placed an order on the wrong-patient and retracted it, and 1 in 37 hospitalized patients had an order placed for them in error.
Using the Wrong-Patient RAR measure in a randomized controlled trial evaluating two interventions for preventing wrong-patient orders. We conducted a three-arm randomized controlled trial to test two interventions designed to prevent wrong-patient orders: an ID-verify alert that displayed the patient's name, gender, and age for the provider to verify with one click; and an IDreentry function that blocked access to the order entry screen until the provider entered the patient's initials, gender, and age. 18 Over 4,000 providers who placed inpatient orders were randomly assigned to receive the ID-verify alert, the ID-reentry function, or neither. Over one million orders were placed in each arm of the study. Compared with the control condition, the ID-verify alert reduced the odds of a wrong-patient order by 16% and the ID-reentry function reduced the odds of a wrong-patient order by 41%. The study found that wrong-patient orders are common, and that interventions like the ID-verify alert and the ID-reentry function can lower the frequency of wrong-patient orders. Although a 41% reduction of wrong-patient errors is substantial, additional safety measures are needed to achieve more complete protection for patients. 
Role of Columbia University Medical Center (CUMC).
CUMC will act as the lead institution and have oversight over study implementation and data analysis. No data will be collected for CUMC patients. Final de-identified data sets will be transferred using a secure file transfer protocol to the principal investigator at CUMC from the study biostatistician at Albert Einstein College of Medicine.
Study Sites. The trial will be conducted at Albert Einstein College of Medicine/Montefiore Medical Center, an integrated regional health system and academic medical center in New York. Study sites include four hospitals, five emergency departments, and more than 100 ambulatory facilities. The health system will use the EpicCare EHR system during this study; Epic has committed to support the project in implementing the Wrong-Patient RAR measure as well as developing and programming a log to capture the number of records open at the time of placing each order. Montefiore met the following six criteria for inclusion as a study site: (1) the capability to implement the Wrong-Patient RAR measure and the log to record the number of records open at the time of placing each order; (2) the capability to merge the results of the Wrong-Patient RAR measure with a table indicating patient, provider, and order characteristics; (3) a minimum of 30,000 admissions per year; (4) a minimum of 50,000 emergency department visits per year; (5) a minimum of 500,000 outpatient visits per year; and (6) patients representing low-income groups, minority groups, the elderly, and individuals with special health care needs ( Table 2) . 
METHODS
Unit of Analysis.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Provider Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria. Any provider who can place an electronic order can potentially place an order on the wrong patient. Prior work showed that wrong-patient errors are made by physicians (60 errors per 100,000 orders), nurse practitioners and physician assistants (74 errors per 100,000 orders), nurses (33 errors per 100,000 orders) and pharmacists (67 errors per 100,000 orders). 18 We will therefore include in the study all providers with the authority to place electronic orders. Providers will be excluded only if their workflow either 1) has a defined requirement to open two patient records simultaneously (eg, mother-infant services), or 2) bypasses the standard order entry process and therefore would not be captured by the outcome measure (eg, radiologists).
To protect providers' identities, all provider identifiers will be replaced with pseudo-identifiers in the analytic data sets prior to analysis. We will request a waiver of consent from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) as this study poses no more than minimal risk for providers (see Protection of Human Subjects).
Randomization
Data Capture
The data required to define orders, orders sessions, and the number of open patient records, patient and provider characteristics, and RAR events is automatically captured by the Epic EHR system. Investigators will collaborate with information technology personnel at the study sites and with Epic throughout the implementation phase of the study to develop the methodology for extracting the required data. At the end of the data collection period, data for all orders placed by study providers during the study period will be extracted, de-identified, encrypted, and transmitted electronically to the investigators for analysis. Preset batch orders (eg, for vaccines) will be excluded from the analysis, as these orders are not under the control of individual providers. These data sets will provide all of the information needed to carry out the analyses.
Protection of Human Subjects
Confidentiality and Consent. Study data will be extracted retrospectively at the midpoint and at the end of the study period. All data sets, reports, and other study records will be de-identified for analysis. Patient medical record numbers and provider ID numbers will be replaced with pseudoidentifiers, and other personal identifiable information (PII) will be deleted from the data sets. The randomized trial will examine two EHR configurations that are both in wide use, with neither representing an established best practice. The randomized trial also does not involve any procedures for which written consent is normally required, and also does not present more than minimal risk to either patients or providers. All near-miss errors will be evaluated in the aggregate and no PII will be used in presentations, publications, or reports. Information will not be released except as necessary for monitoring by the IRB. As such, per the Code of Federal Regulations Title 45, Parts 160 and 164a, we seek an exemption to the requirement for use of the HIPAA Authorization form, and have completed the HIPAA Authorization Exemption request form. Per the code of Federal Regulations Title 45, Part 46.116 (d), we ask the IRB to waive informed consent, and have completed the Informed Consent Waiver request form.
Data Security and Integrity. All files will be kept on password-protected HIPAA-compliant computers in locked offices. Only will research personnel, namely the computer programmer, biostatistician, and prinicipal investigator, will have access to the study data. Analytic data sets will be de-identified, with patient and provider identifiers replaced with pseudo-identifiers. Data files will be imported into the native format of the statistical program to be used for analysis. The data will be checked for internal consistency. Identified anomalies will be examined, and corrections to the data will be made and documented as necessary.
Communication with providers.
Study Limitations
First, the Wrong-Patient RAR measure is designed to identify near-miss errors and does not capture wrong-patient errors that reach patients. However, near-miss errors follow the same causal pathways as errors that reach the patient and cause harm, occur more frequently, and can be reliably measured without the biases inherent in voluntary self-reports by providers. National and international patient safety and regulatory agencies endorse the use of near-miss errors to evaluate safety interventions. [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] Second, orders that are retracted and reordered beyond the 10-minute timeframe (10 minutes to retraction, 10 minutes to reorder) will not be identified by the RAR measure. However, prior work demonstrated that the average retract-and-reorder time was less than 2 minutes; the 10-minute timeframe will detect the majority of retracted near-miss order errors and identify a sufficient number of outcome events to power this study. Finally, this research is limited to only one EHR vendor system. However, when fully rolled out, Epic's clients will provide care for 45%-55% of the U.S. population.
ORIGINAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS PLAN
Descriptive Analysis. We will use descriptive analysis to examine provider-level, patientlevel, order session-level, and order-level covariates for the orders placed in the restricted versus unrestricted mode. Descriptive statistics will be reported as mean and standard deviation for continuous variables, and as count and percentages for categories.
Primary Outcome. The primary outcome measure, the Wrong-Patient RAR measure, is an electronic query run retrospectively against every order placed during the study period to identify instances in which one or more orders placed for a patient were retracted (cancelled) by the same provider within 10 minutes, and then reordered by the same provider for a different patient within the next 10 minutes (RAR events). The primary outcome is wrong-patient order sessions, defined as order sessions that include a wrong-patient RAR event identified by the Wrong-Patient RAR measure.
Primary Analysis (Aim 1).
The primary analysis of the randomized trial is intention-to-treat, with each provider generating a cluster of order sessions. Hence, the order session will be used as the unit of analysis. The primary outcome variable is dichotomous, indicating whether or not each order session contains a wrong-patient RAR event. To determine the effect of trial arm on wrongpatient orders, we will construct a random effects logistic regression model with wrong-patient order sessions as the outcome, and randomization arm as the independent variable, using provider as a random intercept to account for clusters of order sessions within providers. We will estimate the effect of the restricted mode versus the unrestricted mode on the rate of RAR events using the odds ratio and its 95% confidence interval (CI), and will test the null hypothesis using the Wald test with a twotailed significance level of 0.05. The primary outcome is reported as the number of wrong-patient order sessions per 100,000 order sessions.
Subgroup Analysis (Aim 2).
Additional analyses of the effect of the restricted mode versus the unrestricted mode in specified clinical locations will be carried out by including indicators for the locations and location-study arm interaction terms in the model. For subgroup analyses, we will compare the rate of RAR events in emergency department, outpatient, and inpatient settings, and more specifically in inpatient units, including medical/surgical, critical care, pediatrics, and obstetrics units. We will construct similar mixed-effects logistic regression models for each predefined subgroup, with a separate model including an interaction term to test the significance of treatment effects across subgroups, using the Wald test for significance.
For orders placed in the unrestricted mode, we will examine the rate of RAR events and the percentage of orders placed when one, two, three, or four records were open at the time of ordering, overall and stratified by clinical setting. For these analyses the order will be used as the unit of analysis (rather than the order session), because a provider may open or close patient records while placing a series of orders during a single order session. We will report the number of RAR events per 100,000 orders along with 95% binomial confidence intervals, as well as the percentage of all orders FINAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS PLAN Descriptive Analysis. We will use descriptive analysis to examine provider-level, patientlevel, order session-level, and order-level covariates for the orders placed in the restricted versus unrestricted mode. Descriptive statistics will be reported as mean and standard deviation for continuous variables, and as count and percentages for categories.
Primary Analysis (Aim 1).
Subgroup Analysis (Aim 2).
As-Treated Analysis. Because of administrative errors, some providers were not assigned to the trial arm to which they were randomized. Therefore, we will repeat all assessments in as-treated analyses (ie, according to treatment received) such that each order or order session was characterized by the provider's configuration at the time the orders were placed. 
